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ENVISIONING A FUTURE FOR AGE AND DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMSt
Alison Barnes*
This Article considers the reasons for reinterpretations of age and disability and
examines the fundamental reasons for changes in the implementation of both the
ADA and ADEA. Part I presents the basic structure and relevant requirements of
the two statutes and comments on the reasons their legislative purposes are not of-
ten seen as overlapping. Part II discusses the recent Supreme Court decisions that
have undermined the purposes and implementation of both the ADA and ADEA
and chilled causes of action based on the ADA and ADEA. Part III projects the
current problems with anti-discrimination causes into the future, when older peo-
ple will comprise a significant part of the population of people with disabilities
who choose employment. The commentary considers the nature of the baby boom-
ers, the evolution of the job market, and contrasts the impediments to
discrimination litigation in the late 20th century with the differences likely to de-
velop. Finally, the narrative foresees the emergence of employment discrimination
law of renewed vitality based on the ADA.
INTRODUCTION
It is no longer a good time to challenge unlawful age or disabil-
ity discrimination.' In 1990, the nation held high hopes for
eradicating disability discrimination through the enactment of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).2 Though the ADA arrived
in the tenth year of Republican administration intent on limiting
government and its costs, the ADA was a model of bipartisanship.
Congress approved the ADA by a huge majority in both houses.3
Those hopes have turned to pessimism in the wake of the Supreme
Court's 1999 rulings that severely limited the definition of
t @ Alison Barnes, 2001
Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A. 1978,J.D. 1986,
University of Florida; Diploma in Law 1992, University of Cambridge (U.K.).
1. See, e.g., Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability Under the
ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REv. 321, 370-71 (2000).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35
GA. L. REv. 27, 30 n.2, 33-34 nn.18-27 and accompanying text (2002) (observing that the
legislators typically had firsthand knowledge of the needs of people with disabilities, and
that the Senate voted 93.8 percent and the House 93.1 percent in favor of the ADA).
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"individuals with disabilities," and, consequently, limited the num-
ber of prospective claimants under the Act.
4
Opponents of age discrimination have found themselves in simi-
lar straits. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA),' a powerful catalyst for change in United States retire-
ment policy, has been circumscribed by judicial decisions that limit
the use of disparate impact theory. Thus, plaintiffs' cases challeng-
ing employer rules or policies based on disparate impact, rather
than an express intent to discriminate against older workers, have
been marginalized.
Altogether, the ideals and optimism represented by these anti-
discrimination laws have given way to political forces that favor de-
regulated business interests and diminished individual rights. Perhaps
most troubling, the judicial reinterpretation of the ADA and ADEA
assures that plaintiffs cannot get in the courthouse door to raise the
question of an employer's discrimination before a factfinder. Persons
who frequently bear the burden of prejudice or stigma,7 such
4. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc, 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), dis-
cussed infra notes 121-44 and accompanying text.
5. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
6. SeeHazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 617 (1993), discussed infra notes 92-
94 and accompanying text.
7. Race discrimination took an unprecedented step backward with the implementa-
tion of welfare-to-work programs mandated by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). This
Act gives states almost total control of federal block grant funding for welfare programs.
The majority of disabled people have incomes in the lowest quintile in the U.S. population.
See RUTH COLKER & BONNIE POITRAs TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 1
(2000) (stating that "disabled people are the poorest, least educated and largest minority in
America") (citing JOHN M. McNEIL, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 1991-92; DATA FROM
THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION (U.S. Dept of Commerce, Econs. &
Statistics Admin., Bureau of the Census 1993)). Older people also have modest incomes. In
1997, the upper quintile reported $28,700 in income per year, which included their Social
Security payments, while the lowest quintile reported less than $6570, which consisted of
Social Security alone or Supplemental Security Income. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON
MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDERLAW 19 (1999) [hereinafter ELDERLAW]. In 1997, more than
twenty-five percent of the black elderly population had incomes below the federal poverty
line. Id. at 29.
The law distinguished the aged and disabled from persons subject to race discrimination
because neither age nor disability is a suspect class. See Sarah Sutor, et al., The Constitutional
Status of the ADA: An Examination ofAlsbrook v. City of Maumelle in Light of Recent Supreme
Court Decisions Concerning the l1th Amendment, 19 REV. LITIG. 485, 487 (2000); see also
Stephen F. Befort & Holly Linquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance, the Su-
preme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 27-29
(1999) (contrasting the relative success of Title VII and the ADA). Age and disability also
differ from race in that individuals may move into the category, while race is immutable.
Further, disability can be distinguished from either race or age because the race and age
categories are largely self-defining. See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination
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as the poor and those with compromised abilities, have little to
cheer about on the legal front.
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These changes arose from a variety of factors that reflect conser-
vative shifts in the national political mood. The carefully crafted
language of the ADA adopted the regulations9 and case law ' of the
well-regarded Rehabilitation Act of 1973." The ADA has been
criticized as too vague to provide employers with notice of their
obligations.1 2 Many believe the law is misused and its original pur-
poses betrayed because a substantial proportion of plaintiffs are
employees suing their current employers for accommodation of
hidden disabilities such as mental health conditions and back
problems, both of which are difficult to confirm and accommodate
effectively.
The political forces behind the ADA's passage, in contrast, fa-
vored people with serious physical disabilities who were
unemployed because of prejudice or the absence of reasonable
accommodations. The burden of accommodation was justified po-
litically by the purpose of making unemployed, isolated persons
into competent, self-supporting workers. On the other hand, the
with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities
Act?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 307, 315 (2001).
8. Recently the Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of ADEA and ADA pro-
tection. The Court ruled that Congress lacked the power under section 5 of the 14th
Amendment to abrogate state immunity under the 11th Amendment. See Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Therefore, Congress lacked the power to create liability
for discriminatory treatment of state employees under the ADEA. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-34, was amended in 1974 to cover state and local government workers, and the ex-
pansion was held constitutional in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983). See generally,
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation
After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000); Brett E. Cooper, Note, Ageism, the ADEA,
and the Ageless Debate Over Statutory Interpretation, 74 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 175 (2000).
In University ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Court made essentially the same
decision with regard to Title I of the ADA. See generally Sutor et al., supra note 7 (reviewing
an 8th Circuit decision preceding Garrett with a similar holding); Ruth Colker, The Section
Five Quaqmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653 (2000). See also Linda Greenhouse, In Alabama Ruling,
High Court Trumpeted the Last Word: Power, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at 10A (asserting that in
Garrett, the Court ignored substantial congressional evidence of states' disregard for the
rights of disabled persons and substituted its judgment of the ADA's purpose and meaning,
acting as if Congress was just a bad lower court.). This Article must leave these important
effects of reinterpretation to another day.
9. 34 C.ER. pt. 104 (2002)
10. See LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITY LAW 8-9 (1998).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973).
12. See generally Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Tri-
als of Textualism and the Practical Limits of Practical Reason, 74 TUL. L. REv 1207 (2000)
(discussing the need for interpretation, especially textualism and practical reasoning as
tools to approach the ADA).
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ADA is seen by some as posing pitfalls for the unwary businessper-
isson.
The ADEA suffers from the changing character of the target
population. At the time of the ADEA's enactment, a substantial
proportion of older people were poor. 4 Few retirees had pensions.
Older women, who almost universally were without their own pen-
sions, had to live to a very old age on a pittance. 5 The impact of
the Medicare program, enacted in 1964, was not clear. In any case,
the cost of health care had barely begun its rise to the alarming
levels of the 1990s, so Medicare coverage did not dramatically im-
pact seniors' financial well-being.1 6 Workers who lost jobs as
retirement age approached had difficulty finding new work.' 7 Per-
haps, the perceived power of the 1960s "organization" raised the
specter of employees unfairly victimized by dismissals intended to
limit costs.' 8 The ADEA promised to be a weapon to provide secu-
rity to older people who experienced discrimination in their last
years.
In contrast, older people today present a different image. Good
health care and healthy lifestyles create the expectation for many
active years after the traditional retirement age of sixty-five.' 9 For
example, advertisements feature older women contemplating en-
trepreneurial business start-ups.2 0 Happy snowbirds display bumper
13. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Dismissal of Retarded Men Puts Hertz in Federal Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at A10. Two employees with disabilities were dismissed when their
"work coaches" were found "passionately kissing and fondling each other" in a parked car.
Id. The Hertz brief in response to the ADA suit for discriminatory dismissal of the employ-
ees with disabilities stated, "[f]irst, no good deed goes unpunished. Second, do no more
than the law requires, since any generosity beyond that may cause you adverse conse-
quences." Id.
14. See WILLIAM W. LAMMERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE AGING 44-49, 98-106 (1983)
(providing a history of the incremental development of Social Security policy and benefits
expansion from the minimal assistance offered to a few in 1935 through inflation indexing
and substantial percentage increases of the 1970s).
15. See LAMMERS, supra note 14, at 133-34; Frank B. Hobbs with Bonnie L. Damon,
65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, Bureau of the Census and Nat'l Institute on Aging (1996) 4-8.
16. For a brief history of Medicare and U.S. health policy for the aged, see ELDERLAW,
supra note 7, at 211-14, 245-47.
17. See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 4-7.
18. See generally William Hollingsworth Whyte, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1957) (pro-
viding a chilling prophecy of individual subordination to the "organization").
19. See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 3-1-3-3, 3-18 (listing incidence of
functional limitations among those in older age brackets).
20. An example of such advertising appeared in the New York Times Magazine and other
periodicals. It shows a picture of two women who might be a grandmother (on the right)
and a granddaughter beneath text that states: "You're psyched about the future. You're full
of new ideas. You're looking to start a business. You're the one on the right." (emphasis in the
original). Additional text informs the reader that retirement used to mean "the end of your
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stickers that announce they are spending their children's inheri-
tance and, no doubt, the dividends from their smart investments,
income from well-regulated pension funds, and their Social Secu-
rity payments. The popular perception of retirement has shifted
from humble elders to perennial travelers on the tennis courts for
nearly three decades.2'
This Article considers the legal, social, and judicial reasons for
reinterpretations of age and disability. It also examines the funda-
mental reasons for changes in the implementation of both the
ADA and ADEA. Part I presents the basic structure and relevant
requirements of the two statutes and comments on the reasons
their legislative purposes are not often seen as overlapping. Part II
discusses the recent Supreme Court decisions that have under-
mined the purposes and implementation of both the ADA and
ADEA and chilled causes of action based on the ADA and ADEA.
Part III projects the current problems with anti-discrimination
causes into the future, when older people will comprise a signifi-
cant part of the population of people with disabilities who choose
employment. The commentary considers the nature of the baby
boomers, the evolution of the job market, and contrasts the im-
pediments to discrimination litigation in the late 20th century with
the differences likely to develop. Finally, the narrative foresees the
emergence of employment discrimination law of renewed vitality
based on the ADA. This new vitality will be carried forward by
working years... (w)e day plan well-so you can redefine retirement any time and any way
you want. For many, it will be a bridge to a second career." Advertisement for Paine Webber
Financial Advisors (on file with the author).
21. See ELDERLAW supra note 7, at 27-29. The characterization of the elderly as self-
serving "greedy geezers" drew much public attention from the repeal of the Medicare pro-
visions enacted by the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (MCCA), repealed by
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 1979. The MCCA promised
to provide the first substantial increase in Medicare benefits since the program's start in
1965, lifted the sixty day limit on fully paid inpatient hospital care, and capped the twenty
percent co-payment due on physician's fees. See LAwRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON PATRUCCO
BARNES, ELDERLAW (1st ed. 1992) 483-84 (citingJOAN O'SULLIVAN, CATASTROPHIC HEALTH
INSURANCE: MEDICARE 7 (Cong. Research Office, Sept. 5, 1989)). The skilled nursing home
coverage cap was increased from 100 to 150 days and the requirement of prior hospital stay
was dropped. The reform package was a negotiated agreement between legislators and
aging advocates, especially the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), to provide
an initial limited long-term care benefit through the federal social insurance program. Id.
Critics focused primarily on the financing provisions, which required most retirees to pay
higher premiums in exchange for increased benefits and required higher income retirees
to pay more according to their income bracket, up to $1600. Id. A minority of relatively
affluent elderly led the opposition, egged on by the mail campaigns of conservative lobby-
ing groups. Advocates for the new benefits called the protestors "greedy geezers." Id.
Congress repealed the measure on November 21, 1989.
Envisioning a Future
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retirees with disabilities who may create a new climate for accom-
modation of disabilities in thejob market and the nation.
I. AGE DISCRIMINATION AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION:
THE PRESENT LAW
The United States' current discrimination laws flow from the
concept and phrases of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964,22
which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, religion, na-
tional origin and, by amendment, discrimination on the basis of
sex.23 Under Title VII, the Act's employment provisions, employers
may be sued by an individual asserting that an adverse action
against that individual was caused at least in part by a prohibited
motive. A prohibitive motive is one that results in an applicant not
being hired or an employee is demoted, paid less or fired where
race or sex might have been a motive in such a result. The burden
of proof allocation between the plaintiff and defendant requires
that the defendant respond to the plaintiff's prima facie case with
evidence of a permissible motive for the adverse action.24 In the
employment-at-will context, any non-discriminatory motive is ac-
ceptable. The defendant, however, "Bears only the burden of
explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.,
2
5
Absent an alternative reason for the adverse action, the finder of
fact can infer that discrimination took place. 6
The Rehabilitation Act of 197327 is the earliest legislation pro-
hibiting employment discrimination against people with
disabilities. The Act builds on an older law providing vocational
rehabilitation benefits to veterans of World War 1.2 s The Rehabilita-
tion Act and its regulations provide many of the concepts and
definitions later incorporated into the ADA. The Rehabilitation
Act's scope, a compromise with advocates for broader protection
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections throughout 28 and 42 U.S. Code).
23. See Hazen Paper V. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
24. The structure of a case was established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973), a race discrimination case.
25. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981).
26. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-05.
27. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-95 (1973). The legislation originally used the term "handicap,"
but was amended to use the preferred term "disability." Id.
28. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, at 7.
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of persons with disabilities, is limited to federal agencies, 211 federal
contractors receiving substantial funds," and entities receiving
federal grants or participating in federal programs.1
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Congress first prohibited age-based employment discrimination
with the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) in 1967.32 The ADEA prohibits employers from failing or
refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against any individual
with respect to compensation or privileges of employment because
of age.33 The protected class of workers includes anyone over the
age of forty.34 The elements of a primafacie case are similar to other
discrimination laws, except that under the ADEA the plaintiff need
not show that he or she was replaced in the job or promotion de-
sired by a person outside of the protected class30 Thus, a fifty-five
year old replaced by a forty-five year old may have an action under
the ADEA.
An ADEA case, like a Title VII case, follows the structure estab-
36lished in McDonnell Douglas. In order for the plaintiff to avoid
summary judgment against them, the plaintiff must show that 1)
the individual belonged to the protected group; 2) the applicant
applied for, or was employed in and was qualified for, a job for
which the employer sought to hire; 3) despite the applicant's
qualifications, he or she was rejected; and 4) after the rejection the
position remained open, and the employer continued to seek ap-
plicants from persons of the complainant's qualifications or filled
the position with another employee with comparable (or lesser)
qualifications.37
29. 29 C.F.R. § 791 (1967).
30. Id. § 793.
31. Id. § 794.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967). See ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 89-97.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 623.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 411 U.S. at 802.
37. Bohrer v. Hanes Corp. provides the following statement regarding the plaintiff and
defendant's burdens:
Prima facie proof of age discrimination does not necessarily entitle the plaintiff to a
jury determination of his claim. Such proof simply shifts to the defendant employer
the burden of producing evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons .... If the employer
Envisioning a Future
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The burden of proof then shifts to the employer-defendant to
show nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action. Employ
ers can avoid liability under the ADEA by proving that the
motivation behind the adverse action (failing to hire, firing, de-
moting, failing to promote, denying a raise, etc.) was not age
discrimination. The employer can assert the affirmative defense
that the plaintiff failed to fulfill a "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation" (BFOQ),39 i.e., the employer is justified in its disparate
treatment of certain older employees. 4° The defense requires that
substantially all persons over a certain age within the protected
class have certain characteristics that render them unable to per-
form the job safely or efficiently, and that individual capabilities
41cannot be determined.
As another affirmative defense an employer may assert that the
alleged adverse action was not related to the plaintiff's age, but was
related to a "reasonable factor[] other than age" (RFOA).42 While
employers advancing this defense43 have recourse to the widest
range of other possible motives for failing to hire or firing, the
employer must at least meet the burden of production in response
to the plaintiffs prima facie case.4 Absent an employment or union
contract with contrary provisions, many reasons are acceptable.
Such reasons include personality conflicts, low productivity, poor
offers proof, which raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it terminated the
plaintiff for good cause, or of some basis other than age, the presumption of dis-
crimination engendered by the plaintiffs initial evidence is dispelled. 715 F.2d 213,
218 (5th Cir. 1983).
38. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1988) (announcing the defen-
dant's burden in a sex discrimination case).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (1).
40. Under a BFOQ an employer may, for instance, show that a chronological age limit
was "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the ... business." Id. The employer
admits the discriminatory decision is based on age, but justifies its actions with reference to
the requirements of its business purposes. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving the failure to hire applicant as a flight attendant
because of his sex, the court held that having exclusively female flight attendants was not
"reasonably necessary" to the safe transport of passengers, which it deemed to be the es-
sence of Pan Am's business).
41. Constance Kleiner Hood, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with
Disabilities Act: A Second Bite at the Apple, 6 ELDER L.J. 1, 11 (1998); see also, Daniel B. Frier, Age
Discrimination and the ADA: How the ADA May Be Used to Arm Older Americans Against Age Dis-
crimination by Employers Who Would Otherwise Escape Liability Under the ADEA, 66 TEMPLE L.
REv. 173, 178 (1993).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
43. Courts are split on whether the RFOA provision is an affirmative defense or
merely a burden of going forward. ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 132.
44. Id.
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or decreasing work quality, or absenteeism.5 An older employee
may even suffer an adverse action related to work status or pay be-
cause of health problems and have no claim under the ADEA. 46
Another aspect of the ADEA that distinguishes it from the other
discrimination statutes is that it prohibits mandatory retirement
for most workers. This counters the then-existing norm that sub-
jected about forty percent of workers to mandatory retirement at
age sixty-five. 7 Many workers may still be subject to mandatory re-
tirement. The workers include those involved in physically
demanding work that requires reliable, safe competency, including
public safety officials such as firefighters and law enforcement offi-
cers.48 "Bona fide executives or high policymakers" entitled to
substantial, immediate retirement benefits may also be required to
retire from their sensitive positions . No widespread merit-based
evaluation system has been developed to exclude older workers on
the basis of failing ability. Instead, an employer who wants to en-
courage retirement is likely to make it financially desirable for the
employee.
The ADEA, in sum, has significant limits although it improves
the choice available to older workers. On one hand, it only pro-
vides protection from an adverse employment action if the
claimant can show that he or she could fulfill all the employer's
requirements. On the other hand, the ADEA unequivocally pro-
hibits mandatory retirement for most employees. This ends the
presumption that older workers should be removed from the
workforce.
45. Hood, supra note 41, at 10.
46. Id.
47. ELDER.AW, supra note 7, at 97.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j) (1994).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1994); 29 C.ER. § 1625.12 (2001) (highlighting that the provi-
sion protects the interests of businesses seeking innovative leadership, while assuring that
the forced "retiree" has a comfortable income without employment).
Envisioning a Future
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B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) addresses
anti-discrimination requirements in employment settings.5 In the
manner of federal statutes, it sets out definitions of terms,5 ' the na-
ture of discriminatory activities, and enforcement measures. The
regulations are quite important to the law's interpretation, though
courts have not always agreed with all their provisions. 52 Additional
interpretive guidance is provided by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) Interpretive Guidance,53 which
provides a section-by-section analysis of the regulations, and a
technical assistance manual, 4 which adds further discussion and
examples supporting the interpretation. A still longer treatment of
the material is found in the EEOC Enforcement Guidance. 5
Tide I prohibits discrimination in job application procedures,
hiring, advancement or discharge, compensation,job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.56 The ADA
protects an "individual with a disability," who is defined in three
ways: one who has a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of that
individual; having a record of such impairment; or, being regarded
as having such an impairment.57 A physical or mental impairment
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17. Regulations by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission on Title I are found at 29 C.ER. §§ 1630.1-16 (2001).
51. The statute begins with three definitions that apply throughout the Act: "Auxiliary
aids and services", "[d]isability," and "[s]tate." 42 U.S.C. § 12102. The most frequently used
term, "disability," means "with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
§ 12102(2).
The segregation of these definitions from any substantive title provides the basis for the
Supreme Court's opinion in the 1999 cases that no agency has interpretative authority over
the Act's provisions. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999). Thus, the
EEOC regulations defining a person with a disability as one evaluated in an unmitigated
state, 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) (2001), carries no weight with the Court. Sutton, 527 U.S. at
479-80.
52. The regulations for Title I, under the enforcement powers of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), appear in 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2001).
53. 9 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (2001).
54. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, available at http://www.ada-infornet.org/
documents/general-document/general-doc.asp (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
55. ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/
accomodation.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The regulations provide further specifications.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
[VOL. 35:1&2
FALL 2001-WINTER 2002]
includes physiological disorders, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one of the major body systems." Major life
activities include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing." Generally, an employer must make adjustments or
modifications that are "reasonable" in nature and cost in order to
allow full participation by a person with a disability.0 A person who
can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
such accommodations or adjustments, is termed a "[q]ualified in-
dividual with a disability."6' Thus, the scope of the ADA's coverage6
2
depends upon one being a "[q]ualified individual with a disabil-
ity," such as substantially impaired in a major life activity, but not so
impaired as to be precluded from performing fundamental job
duties, with reasonable accommodations if necessary.
In sum, the ADA provides significant protections lacking in the
ADEA by requiring examination of the essential, rather than
marginal, functions of the job.63 While deference is given to the
employer's job description and assertions about duties, courts
often inquire further and make their own determination. In ad-
dition, the ADA requires the employer and employee to engage
in "an informal, interactive process ... [to] ... identify the pre-
cise limitations resulting from the disability and the potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limita-
tions."6 4 Accommodation need only be "reasonable" and, if so,
58. E.g., 29 C.ER. § 1630(h) (2001) (stating that body systems include neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascu-
lar, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities).
59. Id. § 1630(i).
60. Id. § 1630.9.
61. Id. § 1630.2(m).
62. This Article is concerned primarily with persons pursuing claims under the first
part of the three part definition, substantially impaired in a major life activity, leaving the
troublesome problems of the other two categories for another day. Also omitted is the in-
teresting and underdeveloped area of "associational disability" discrimination, which is
discrimination against a qualified individual based on the disability of an individual with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a family, business, social or other relation-
ship or association.
63. See, e.g.,Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (deciding a
case involving a food server unable to recite a daily menu under pressure of a busy meal
time, holding that the employer can require recitation as an essential function of the job);
EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations Ltd., 820 F Supp. 1060 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (finding that
driving is not an essential function of the work of an impaired executive).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (o) (3) (2001).
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must be provided by the employer,6 ' though the cost may not be de
minimzs.66
C. The Legal and Political Separation ofAge
and Disability Discrimination
Most attorneys specializing in services to the elder population
67
have never used the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) to pursue a client's claim. This is curious, since the
ADA offers protection against discrimination in employment,
which anecdotal evidence suggests occurs for older people with
some frequency.68
This oddity is best explained by the ADA's political origin, which
stands firmly on the claims of disabled individuals of working age
who could not get jobs because of fear, or mistake, or prejudice
69that undervalues their real capabilities. When Congress enacted
the ADA, the legislation targeted young adults using wheelchairs
or who had other physical infirmities like blindness or deafness.
In contrast, older people with health problems and chronic
conditions are assumed to be interested in retirement, not the op-
portunity to work. Further, the older population has its own
identity and stereotypes. The clients of the elder law attorney
would almost certainly not identify themselves as having disabili-
65. Title I and its regulations clearly imply that the employer bears the cost of the ac-
commodation because the definition of undue burden allows consideration of factors
relevant to the employer's financial resources. Tide I, however, makes no reference to the
prospective or current employee's resources. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(1994). Further, the
employee can refuse any accommodation offered by the employer but risks being unable to
perform the job's essential functions and, therefore, being one who is not a qualified per-
son with a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (2001). Title III, on public accommodations,
explicitly prohibits imposing a surcharge on persons with disabilities to cover the costs of
reasonable modifications or auxiliary aids and services. 29 C.F.R. § 36.301 (c) (2001).
66. See e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630(p) (2001); Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that the cost of Manhattan parking spaces for Legal Aid attorney with
severe ambulatory disabilities may be a reasonable accommodation, though cost might be
up to $520 per month).
67. The National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., founded in 1989, is the prin-
cipal organization for law practitioners specializing in the legal needs of the aged. For
information, visit their web-site at http://www.naela.org.
68. See S. REP. No. 106-229, at 83-99 (2000) (reporting that "[o]lder workers continue
to face numerous obstacles to employment," regardless of the fact that official unemploy-
ment statistics reflect low unemployment rates because workers are considered to have
withdrawn from the employment market), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/senate/senate22lp106.html [hereinafter Developments in Aging].
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (5) (1995).
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ties. Conversely, people allied with the disability rights movement
would almost universally distinguish themselves from the elder
population, believing that age is not the source of difficulty.
D. An Aged Person is Sometimes a Person with a Disability
Age is not, in itself, a disability. The Senate Committee Report
on the ADA excludes the possibility of using age as a proxy for dis-
ability.7° Discrimination because of an age-related disability,
however, is analogous to the very types of discrimination the ADA
prohibits. The ADA's findings and purposes state that society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities. This
legislation is necessary to remedy intentional and unintentional
discrimination including the effects of architectural barriers,
transportation and communication barriers, and overprotective
rules and policies.7' These purposes seem to apply to older people
with disabilities as readily as to younger disabled persons.
The universal effects of aging include both natural changes in
abilities and senses, and a rising incidence of chronic conditions
with symptoms that impact the awareness and activities of older
people. Occurring to different individuals at very different ages,
but increasingly likely with advancing age, are the loss of physical
vigor, speed, strength, and flexibility.73 Diseases, such as arthritis or
congestive heart disease, impair these functions, sometimes se-
verely, for a minority of individuals.
Perceptive functions decrease from a very early age. Vision (as
so many discover) universally declines beginning in one's forties
while hearing becomes perceptibly less acute in one's fifties.74 Un-
natural deterioration, in contrast, might result from glaucoma or
retinal deterioration related to diabetes or the effects of long term
70. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2), (5).
72. See Sharon A. Jackson, The Epidemiology of Aging, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC
MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY 203 (William R. Hazzard, et al., eds., 4th ed. 1999).
73. See ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 13.
74. Id. at 14. See Thomas S. Rees, Auditory and Vestibular Dysfunction, in PRINCIPLES OF
GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note 72, at 617 (finding that the loss of
hearing ability is widespread among older people, and the etiology of age-related hearing
dysfunction is frequently difficult to determine); see also Robert E. Kalina, Aging and Visual
Function, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note 72, at 603
(acknowledging that many changes in vision in later life are universal, inevitable, and cur-
rently untreatable).
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exposure to loud noise. If a person is lucky and active, significant
physical symptoms of aging may not be felt until age eighty or even
ninety; but, should one live so long, symptoms will inevitably come
that intrude into the routine activities of an active day.75 The symp-
toms of chronic conditions may begin at any age, often exist for a
time without reaching a threshold of awareness or impairment,
and may develop into significant impairment of function.
76,Cognitive function also declines with age. Some natural func-
tions of the human brain, such as memory, are naturally less
capable with increasing age. Fortunately, for decades, the brain
compensates by using other portions of its pathways and no signifi-
cant effects are detectable."
Thus, aging includes both natural senescence and disease proc-
esses, which might be exacerbated or accelerated by genetics,
lifestyle, and habits. It may be difficult, but surely possible, to de-
termine whether an impairment is a deviation from the natural
course of aging, if necessary. Few cases have considered whether
the entirely natural effects of aging on eyesight, hearing, or re-
flexes, for example, qualifies an individual as a "individual with a
disability" under the ADA.78
The definition of a person with a disability in the context of
employment suggests that a decline from the "normal" range of
capabilities at whatever age is enough to qualify a plaintiff. 79 Those
who have chronic conditions in addition to advanced age, though
75. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 72, at 213 fig.15-2 (showing the rising rates of severe
disability after age sixty-five projected to the year 2040 based on various assumptions about
longevity and disability rates).
76. The severe effects of Alzheimer's disease, for example, are symptoms of that dis-
ease, and do not affect most people no matter how long they might live. ELDERLAW, supra
note 7, at 17; see Claudia H. Kawas, Azheimer's Disease, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE
AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note 72, at 1257.
77. ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 14.
78. A possible explanation for the paucity of cases dealing with the natural effects of
aging as a disability in the ADA context may center on the line of cases that culminated in
the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488
(1999). In that case, the Court held that under the ADA, the determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities is made with reference to
the mitigating measures an individual employs. Id. at 488. Therefore, an elderly person who
uses glasses, hearing aids, or medication may no longer qualify as a person with a disability
once the corrective measures are considered. See also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527
U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that a disadvantaged UPS mechanic capable of controlling
his hypertension through medication was not substantially limited in any major activities).
79. 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(i) (2001) (defining "major life activities" as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and work-
ing") (emphasis added); id. at § 1630.20)(1) (i) (2001) (providing as one definition of the
phrase "substantially limits" as being "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the aver-
age person in the general population can perform" (emphasis added)).
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the conditions might be quite common, do not represent the aver-
age person. Therefore, are they persons with disabilities if they are
substantially impaired?0
In the alternative, a plaintiff's body with its chronic impairments
is the body as it naturally occurs at eighty or ninety years of age,
rather than being an "individual with a disability" under the ADA.
If the standard encompassed by the term "average" is set by age
group, a number of aged potential plaintiffs who have significant
age-related impairments that are typical physical and mental con-
ditions for the "average" person of that age may fall outside the
ADA's scope.
Because indications in the ADA are scarce, it may be possible
that many impairments commonly associated with aging are suffi-
cient to qualify an individual as disabled, as compared with the
"average person.' '. At the least, elderly disabled people suffering
from chronic diseases and their symptoms might qualify as "per-
sons with disabilities" under the ADA.
II. AGE AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION LIMITED
In such a socially sensitive public arena as discrimination policy,
the impact of important laws may be expected to change over
time. The more significant the scope and effect of the law, the
greater the potential backlash if its mandates outpace society's
norms or resources. Both the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) re-
flected and then changed society's values at the time they were
passed. Both laws have undergone recent reinterpretations that
blunt their effectiveness in identifying discrimination and render it
unrewarding for perpetrators. Significant changes in social policy
have curtailed the generous helping hand offered to elders by the
80. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (holding that a person who suffers from a physical or men-
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities can establish a
disability under the ADA).
81. 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(j) (1)(i) (2001) (using the "average person in the general popu-
lation" as the point of comparison in determining whether a person's impairment
"substantially limits" a major life activity); see White v. Orange Auto Ctr., 101 F. Supp. 2d 485,
487, 494 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (holding that a sixty-three year old male who suffered from poor
vision, cataracts, and macular degeneration disease established a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether he was substantially limited in any major life activity when his best cor-
rected vision was 20/200).
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Older Americans Act of 1965. s2 Similarly, the social characteriza-
tion of people with disabilities and their advocates may also be
undergoing a cynical transformation as resistance grows to the
ADA's requirements.
A. Judicial Interpretation Limitations on the ADEA
Under the ADEA, employer decisions that treat employees dif-
ferently depending on their age, such as enforcing rules that
expressly distinguish persons in the protected class from those out-
side the class and treat those in the protected class less favorably,
may be examples of disparate treatment.83 Disparate treatment is
prohibited by the ADEA unless it falls under the BFOQ (bona fide
occupation qualification) defense or RFOA (reasonable factor
other than age) exception. Other facially neutral rules or policies
may in fact treat workers in the protected class differently from
others, causing a disparate impact on workers of the protected
814class. The Supreme Court acknowledged the prohibition on dis-
parate impact discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power,5 a race
discrimination case. The Court stated that the "[Civil Rights] Act
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are
,,816fair in form but discriminatory in operation. An example is a
rule that considers only recent years in evaluating work experi-
ence, the so-called "recency factor.",87 Such a rule is likely to
discriminate against older workers who have a broader range and
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3058 (1998) (providing health, housing, and economic benefits
to the elderly).
83. Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc, 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that em-
ployer's desire to save money could be linked to age discrimination), reh'g denied, 728 F.2d
976 (8th Cir. 1984). But see Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610 (holding that in the ADEA context,
disparate treatment requires that the plaintiffs age must have "actually played a role in [the
employer's decision-making] process and had a determinative influence").
84. See Geller v. Markham, 635 F2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that "a prima fa-
cie case of discriminatory impact may be established by showing that an employer's facially
neutral practice has a disparate impact upon members of plaintiffs [ADEA] class, in this
case teachers over 40 years of age"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
85. 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
86. Id. at 431.
87. Haskins v. Sec'y of HHS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 256 (W.D. Mo. 1984)
(finding that the recency factor employed in this case, which precluded consideration of
experience beyond ten years, caused a disparate impact among older persons); cf Eason v.
Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 512 F Supp. 1199, 1204 (D.D.C. 1981) (holding that a
policy of giving half credit for experience over ten years old had no adverse impact due to
age), aff'd, 701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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duration of experience, since significant qualification information
will fall outside recent years.
Notable ADEA disparate impact cases have involved the higher
compensation typically provided older workers. For example, Geller
v. Markham,s8 the first case to apply disparate impact theory under
the ADEA involved a fifty-five year old teacher with extensive ex-
perience. She sued a Connecticut school district for failure to hire
her for a permanent position because of a cost-cutting policy that
limited hiring to only those with few years of experience."9 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that Geller established a
prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework that re-
quired the defendant to refute her claims or abide by a jury
verdict.90 Geller's evidence included expert testimony that showed
that 92.6 percent of teachers over age forty in the state had suffi-
cient experience to be excluded from consideration for hiring
under the rule. 9'
In 1993, Hazen Paper v. Biggins,02 a case where the employer fired
the plaintiff at the age of sixty-two amid charges that the plaintiff
was doing business with a competitor, ushered in a new era in age
discrimination litigation and undermined the ADEA's potentially
broad sweep. The plaintiff showed that in a short time, after ten
years with his employer, his retirement benefits would have vested
had he not been fired. 3 The vesting rule, however, depended upon
his years at the company, not his age. That is, if he had joined the
company at eighteen, he might be as young as twenty-eight when
his benefits vested, well below the threshold that defines the pro-
tected class under the ADEA. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff had no cause of action because years of service was not a
proxy for age.94 Thus, no inference that the plaintiff was fired be-
cause of age was permissible.
After Hazen Paper, the higher costs associated with long term
employees cannot support an inference of age discrimination.
88. 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1032-33.
91. Id. at 1033. The court might have given more weight to the fact that over sixty per-
cent of teachers under forty also had enough experience to be excluded by the rule.
92. 507 U.S. 604, 604 (1993).
93. Id. at 607.
94. See id. at 609 (requiring direct evidence of age-related animus to meet the re-
quirement for discriminatory intent and holding that "there is no disparate treatment
under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the
employee's age").
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Rather, the plaintiff must show disparate treatment, an intent to
treat the older worker worse because of age.
95
A further difficulty with the ADEA is that it provides no protec-
tion to older workers who are demoted or fired because of the
effects of disability.96 The ADEA sought to provide older workers
opportunities to overcome unwarranted stereotypes and prejudices
against them, and to enable them to get good jobs that they were
able to perform. It did not take up the cause of older workers who
are less capable physically or mentally than younger workers or
than their own younger selves. The ADEA includes no require-
ments for accommodating workers with disabilities, nor does it
require that the employer consider anyone who does not meet the
917employer's expectation of efficient and effective services.
As a result, the ADEA leaves significant room for discrimination
against older workers. First, the older, chronically impaired worker
who must achieve a specific result without assistance from others
or without resources for special equipment may be unable to com-
pensate for changes in productivity due to aging. The older worker
presenting such problems might be hired because of the ADEA,
but may soon be fired without an opportunity to show his or her
worth as a worker. The likelihood of an adverse action against such
a worker is, of course, exacerbated by any employer stereotypes
that raise skepticism and impatience with early performance or
mistakes. Thus, the older worker who compensates for her lesser
speed and strength due to a chronic condition by conscientious
organization and motivating co-workers to willingly engage in
teamwork that limits the impact of her physical impairments may
not be able to continue as a valued employee. Second, the same
might be true of a skilled craftsperson who could compensate for
95. See, e.g., Grant T Moher, The ADEA at the Top of the Food Chain: Who's Protecting the
Higher-Salaried Employees?, ELDER'S ADVISOR, Vol. 1, No. 2 at 38 (1999); see also, Frier, supra
note 41, at 184, 189. See generally Kester Spindler, Comment, Shareholder Demands for Higher
Corporate Earnings Have Their Price: How Courts Allow Employers to Fire Older Employees for Their
Achievements, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 807 (2000).
96. See Frier, supra note 41, at 175-76; Hood, supra note 41, at 11.
97. See generally Frier, supra note 41 (concluding that the ADA provides protection for
older workers who suffer adverse action because of impaired performance due to ill
health). Older applicants might also be excluded on the basis of generalizations about the
correlation between age and a lack of strength or stamina. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 E2d 224, 237 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that bus company need not hire extra-board
drivers over the age of forty because the job was "strenuous"). But see Western Airlines v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (holding that no BFOQ defense established by the airline that
required flight engineers to retire at age sixty contrary to Federal Aviation Administration
requirements and industry practice).
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diminished visual acuity by appropriate lighting and equipment
but is allowed and provided only the standard work tools.
Without a doubt, age discrimination continues. A February 2000
Bureau of Labor Statistics study of layoffs over the prior three years
indicates that workers age fifty-five to sixty-four gained reemploy-
ment at a rate of only fifty-six percent, as compared with eighty-
eight percent reemployment for workers age twenty to twenty-four,
and eighty percent for workers twenty-five to fifty-four.9 8 Further,
the congressional debates on the ADEA characterized employers'
views on older workers as paradoxical. These views included priz-
ing the stability, better skills, and greater knowledge of older
workers, but "despising" older people as applicants and new hires
because of the possibility (i.e., both stereotype and statistically in-
creased likelihood) of poor health.99 The ADEA does not at this
time, however, hold the potential for expansion for more compre-
hensive coverage of workers on the basis of age.
B. The Fading of Age-based Social Services
The Older Americans Act (OAA) has provided a package of so-
cial services to elderly people since its enactment in 1965.00 Its
legislative purpose was "to assist... older people [to] secure equal
opportunity to the full and free enjoyment" of adequate income,
good physical and mental health care and rehabilitative services,
suitable housing, and employment opportunities. ° At the time of
enactment, close to half of current retirees' incomes fell below the
federal poverty level. 0 2 The OAA required establishment of an
Area Agency on Aging in every state, which administered statewide
plans for aging services. 0 3 A substantial package of nutrition and
community-based services was to be provided to anyone age 65 or
98. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Worker Displacement During the Late
1990s (August 9, 2000), available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/disp.nr0.htm (last
visited May 11, 2002). Workers age sixty-five and older gained reemployment at a rate of
only twenty-six percent, a statistic difficult to adjust for genuine voluntary retirement. See id.
99. See Hood, supra note 41, at 4.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13 (1965).
101. Id. § 3021.
102. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING RELATED STATISTICS, OLDER AMERICANS
2000: KEY INDICATORS OF WELL-BEING 12 (2000) available at http://www.agingstats.gov
(contrasting the estimated poverty rate for persons age sixty-five and older at thirty-five
percent in 1959, with a rate of eleven percent in 1998).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3025-3028.
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older, without regard to income.0 4 At congregate meal sites, for
example, any senior could receive a hot meal at least once a day
with no obligation to donate toward its cost.'05
The idea soon suffered from a shortage of funds that called for
choices with regard to what services were available. Meal sites tar-
geted their social services programs to poverty assistance, rather
than information and referral, and recreation for more affluent
seniors. The composition of the poor older population also
changed to include substantial numbers of foreign-born elders. By
the time of the 1987 reauthorization hearings, participation in nu-
trition programs had dropped because many participants wanted
familiar ethnic foods and needed non-English programs to meet
their needs.0 6 Advocates and legislators failed repeatedly to agree
on new criteria to guide state and federal government on funding
and delivery of senior services. Funds for existing programs con-
tinued to shrink without reauthorization until 1999.107
The era of age-based benefits under the OAA is essentially
over.0 8 Only information and referral regarding social insurance
programs (Social Security and Medicare) are readily available and
suited to the needs of non-poor seniors through senior centers.
Other significant bright lines in aging policy also are blurring. For
example, the eligibility age for Social Security is creeping upward
month by month according to a formula adopted by Congress, so
that in 2006 the retirement age will be sixty-eight.00 Medicare, the
social insurance program for both the aged and persons with long-
term disabilities, covers a shrinking portion of beneficiary health
care costs. The combination of deductibles, co-payments, and
non-covered health care expenses, such as prescription and non-
104. Id. § 3303-d.
105. This is theoretically still true since the policy underlying the OAA has not
changed. The choice of services and food, and the company, makes congregate sites well
targeted for poor, ethnic minority seniors.
106. ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 397. State suits challenging the targeting of funds for
services to the elderly living alone and those age seventy-five and older were successfully
challenged because of their frequent invalidity when applied to minority elderly. Id.
107. The OAA, through its Title III community-based services program, continues to
serve the purpose of maintaining independence among the aged and to formally prohibit
means testing. See Developments in Aging, supra note 68, at 253-55, 259-65.
108. Robert B. Hudson, The History and Place of Age-Based Public Policy, 19 GENERATIONS,
1, 5-10 (1995) (noting that the U.S. is distinctive among developed nations in providing
substantially more social welfare benefits for the aged than others).
109. Beginning in 2000, the normal retirement age (NRA) is increasing in two-month
increments until the NRA is sixty-seven in 2002. ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 164. Thus, eve-
ryone born in 1960 or later has an NRA of sixty-seven.
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prescription drugs, has reduced average Medicare coverage to just
under half of total beneficiary health care costs.,10
The aged, as a group, are no longer the objects of society's guilt
and generosity. The political will to use age as a proxy for need has
faded, along with much of the will to provide support without ob-
ligation on the part of the recipient. That is, the aged who do their
part (or have the Social Security record to show they have done so)
and those who have significant special needs such as physical ill-
ness or frailty are likely to benefit from a renewed spirit of
benevolence."
C. The Limitations on the ADA
The definition of an "individual with a disability" is the most de-
bated term in the ADA's history."2 A disabled person is one who
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the individual's major life activities. " 3 Substantial limita-
tion means that the person is unable to perform a major life
activity the average person in the general population can perform,
or is significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or dura-
tion in which the person can perform the activity." 4 In the
employment context, a person is significantly restricted in the abil-
ity to perform either a class of jobs, or a broad range of jobs in
various classes, compared to the average person with comparable
training, skills, and abilities."5 If a disabled person holds or desires
a particular job, the employee or prospective employee must be
"qualified," which means able to perform the essential functions of
the job held or sought."6 Essential functions takes into account
those in any written job description and gives deference to the
110. Id.at2ll.
111. The likely errors and unwanted effects of such views were explored in the sympo-
sium issue on aging and public policy in 19 GENERATIONS (1995).
112. The notable case of Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), first announced who is
an "individual with a disability." The Court held that Sydney Abbott, an individual with as-
ymptomatic HIV, is a person with a disability in that she is substantially impaired in a major
life activity, reproduction. Id. She, therefore, had standing to challenge her dentist's deci-
sion to fill her cavity in a hospital rather than in his office, as discrimination under the ADA.
Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
114. 29 C.ER. § 1630(j)(1) (2001).
115. Id. § 1630(j)(3)(i).
116. Id. § 1630.2(m).
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employer's view of essential tasks." 7 Under the Title I regulations,
essential functions are those that the position was created to per-
form, or a limited number of employees are available to perform,
or the functions are highly specialized so the worker is hired for
his or her particular expertise or ability."
8
The ADA requires more of covered entities, including employ-
ers, than the ADEA. The employer and employee are to engage in
a dialogue to determine whether there is any "reasonable accom-
modation" necessary to enable the individual to perform job
functions.' Reasonable accommodation may include adjustments
to the job application process to enable a person to be considered
(as described above), modifications to the work environment or
the circumstances under which the work is usually performed, or
adjustments that enable a person to enjoy equal benefits and privi-j,- •120
leges of employment.
In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases12 1 that
must surely have a profound impact on the course of ADA litiga-
tion. In each, the plaintiffs had chronic disabilities that were
significantly corrected by drugs, assistive devices, or natural com-
pensation by the senses for lost capabilities. The Suttons, twin
sisters and qualified pilots, had eyesight that was correctable to
20/20;122 truck driver Kirkingberg had "monocular vision" because
of one eye with extreme nearsightedness, but had an excellent
driving record that suggested that he compensated with depth
perception based on perception other than binocular vision;
1 23
and, mechanic Murphy had severe high blood pressure that was
lowered by the use of medication.1
24
The Court reviewed the plaintiffs' ADA claims, taking particular
interest in the threshold question of whether they qualified as
claimants to protection under the ADA. The Court ruled that es-
tablishing that the plaintiff is a person with a disability is
necessary. 12 A negative answer to this question cuts off further in-
quiry into whether the employer excluded the individual based
117. Id. § 1630.2(n).
118. Id. § 1630(n) (2).
119. Id. § 1630.2(o).
120. Id.
121. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
122. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
123. Kirkingberg, 527 U.S. at 559-60.
124. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
125. Id. at 524-25.
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upon disability.12 6 That is to say, the employer is free to exclude an
applicant for many reasons, including matters of physical capabil-
ity, provided the person is not within the class protected by the law.
For example, an employer is free to prefer a taller applicant be-
cause being moderate in height is not a substantial impairment in
a major life activity. Similarly, an employer generally is free to pre-
fer a slimmer applicant because being moderately overweight is
not a disability.
If, however, the obesity of a competitor in the hiring pool is a dis-
ability under the ADA, a number of requirements must be met
before that overweight applicant can be excluded on the basis of
being overweight. Specifically, the employer must not set up en-
trance tests that tend to exclude overweight persons.2 7 The
employer must not conclude that a person is medically disabled
without a specific reason and/or demonstration that obesity impairs
the applicant's ability to perform the duties of the job.12 8 Rather, the
employer must determine specifically that this individual cannot
perform the job even with reasonable accommodation,129 or poses
an immediate threat to others, 130 or the accommodations needed to
enable the individual to perform the essential functions of the job
pose an undue burden to the employer.'3
In each case, the Court held that the plaintiff was not a person
with a disability, explaining that the determination must be made
based on the person's condition with any mitigating measures,
such as, drugs, aids or other tools that might be used to alleviate
the effects of the disability.
3 2 Thus, the Suttons' contact lenses,
3
126. Id.
127. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (2001).
128. Id. § 1630.14(a).
129. Id. § 1630(o).
130. Id. § 1630.2(r) (stating that a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation). The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 12113,
excludes only individuals who are a direct threat to others on the job. The EEOC regula-
tions, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001), expanded the description to "the individual and
others," an interpretation that went unchallenged for a decade. Recent cases have chal-
lenged the paternalism of excluding a person with a disability from filling a position that
might endanger his or her health (but poses no threat to others on thejob). See Echazabal v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001) (divided court holding that plain-
tiff, Mario Echazabal, who had worked at the refinery as an employee of various
maintenance contractors for more than twenty years, cannot be excluded on the basis of
disability when he applies to work for the refinery itself, on the basis that the work might
aggravate a chronic condition that quite possibly has developed due to exposure to solvents
in the refinery).
131. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2001).
132. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488; Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 563; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
133. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475.
Envisioning a Future
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Kirkingberg's natural visual compensation, 134 and Murphy's medi-
cations13 5 negated any claims they might have brought under the
ADA. In Sutton, the Court referred to the plaintiffs' "hypothetical
uncorrected state"36 as though disability had been eliminated from
their lives, while the employers' reason for excluding them was the
existence of disability.
ADA commentators have sharply criticized these decisions. 37
Each case raises somewhat different questions. While it might be
reasonable that the Suttons do not come under the protection of
the ADA because of their corrected vision, the Court ignored the
fact that they were rejected not for their corrected vision but
rather for their uncorrected eyesight in the better eye, which did
not meet the employer's standard of 20/100.138 The employer re-
quired better vision than the Federal Aviation Administration
regulations, 139 suggesting that the exclusion was not solely based on
a safety standard, or at least the best substantiated safety standard.
Further, the Suttons were excluded from the hiring process spe-
cifically because of their physical impairment: poor uncorrected
vision.
140
The other cases are equally frustrating. Kirkingberg could not
claim the ADA's protection though he was excluded because of his
monocular vision, despite the fact he had no impairment from his
monocular vision.14 ' The Court stated that it did not need to reach
the question of whether Kirkingberg is qualified because he is dis-
qualified on the basis of Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations regardless of a DOT waiver program that allowed Kirk-
ingberg to drive for another employer while the case was
134. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567.
135. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
136. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
137. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 1; Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton
Court's Closeting of Disabilities, 43 How. L.J. 499, 500-01 (2000).
138. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476.
139. Id. at 475-76.
140. The Court observed, with some truth, that the impairment alleged by each of the
plaintiffs affected the major life activity of "working," and that the category necessarily in-
volves some circular reasoning. Id. At 493. For example, the plaintiff alleges the employer
did not hire him because the employer discriminated on the basis of disability or perceived
disability. That is, both the impairment and the evidence of the discrimination involved
difficulty with the major life activity of "working." Id. This observation, however, became
more attenuated when the Court asserted that the employers did not discriminate because
they did not believe plaintiffs were substantially impaired in the major life activity of working,
only that the plaintiffs were physically incapable of working for them. See id.
141. Two of the three plaintiffs also argued they were "regarded as" persons with dis-
abilities. Id. at 489. The Court in each rejected these arguments as creating no cause of
action. See id. at 489-91; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521-22.
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pending. 142 Thus, he was not a person with a disability, rather he
was excluded from work because of his disability, and he was given a
waiver to pursue that same work in spite of his disability.
The Murphy case is perhaps the most chilling miscarriage of a
threshold standing determination. Murphy suffered from ex-
treme high blood pressure, the Court reports, since he was ten
years old. 144 His blood pressure, as reported, varied from high to
dangerous, even when he took medication. Thus, he must be a
person with a disability since such high blood pressure creates
great risks of cerebrovascular accidents and organ damage,'
45
which can be assumed to progress whenever he is insufficiently
medicated. Alternatively, his medications were almost certainly po-
tent enough to create such symptoms as disorientation, fatigue,
impotence, and other symptoms 146 that might readily be consid-
ered a substantial impairment in a major life activity.
Numerous experts reject the validity of the Court's analysis.
47
The Court's dividing line between the threshold for "individuals
with disabilities" under the Act creates unprecedented difficul-
ties. 48 An individual must be sufficiently affected by a disability to
be considered "substantially impaired in a major life activity" de-
spite the use of mitigating measures that one would normally
choose. Yet, the same individual in that mitigated state must be
142. See Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 560.
143. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521 (noting that Murphy's case came from the only circuit
requiring assessment of disability with mitigating measures).
144. Id. at 519.
145. See The Epidemiology of Aging, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERON-
TOLOGY, supra note 72, at 207 tbl.15-1 (incidence of hypertension and cerebrovascular
disease by age, by race); Jullius I. Ancheta & Michael J. Reding, Stroke Diagnosis and Treat-
ment: A Multidisciplinary Effort, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY,
supra note 72, at 1239 (finding that the effects and treatment of strokes do not differ signifi-
cantly by age).
146. See William B. Applegate, Hypertension, in PRINCIPLES OF GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND
GERONTOLOGY, supra note 72, at 718-20.
147. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 1 at 370-71;Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau,
Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would
They Fare Better Before aJury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REv. LITIG. 505, 535 (2000).
148. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 7, at 329-31 (advancing two primary flaws in
the Court's decisions: 1) the Court presumes the fungibility of jobs in asserting that em-
ployers did not regard the plaintiffs as disabled in general, but found them unable to do the
particular job for which they applied; 2) the Court's construction of the employers' deci-
sions, taken at face value, excludes virtually all plaintiffs because no employer ever
determines that an employee is unfit for work anywhere in the employer's industry). See
generally Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton Court's Closeting of Disabilities,
43 How. L.J. 499 (2000) (asserting that the Supreme Court's emphasis on the threshold
definition of "individual with a disability" serves to trap people with disabilities in a category
separate from others, contrary to the most basic purposes of the ADA).
Envisioning a Future
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
able to perform all the essential functions of the job. The class of
persons helped enough by accommodations to reach this level of
capability while remaining substantially impaired is relatively
small. 49 The Court's analysis makes it impossible for most people
with disabilities of body systems other than perceptive organs and
skeletal-muscular systems to qualify under the Act if they utilize
drugs and devices appropriately. For example, the diabetic using
insulin effectively may no longer be a person with a disability. Yet,
if the individual stops using insulin, he or she would quickly be-
come unable to do anyjob, and die. The analysis ignores the effect
of some conditions, such as some diabetes, to shorten life and
cause organ damage.15 Even an amputee might no longer have a
discrimination claim, if he or she uses a prosthesis to perform ma-
jor life activities about as well as others.
The criticisms of the Court's decisions build on a groundswell of
questions regarding lower courts' handling of ADA cases. Profes-
sor Colker's research found cause to question the federal district
courts' handling of ADA claims.'5' Over ninety-three percent of
ADA cases are decided for the defendant. 15 2 Professor Colker sug-
gests two principal reasons why the findings differ significantly
from Rehabilitation Act results, despite the similarity of the laws.1
3
First, she cites the relative weakness of the EEOC, which was
charged with writing the regulations for ADA Title I, while Reha-
bilitation Act regulations were promulgated in large part by the
Department of Health and Human Services. 154 Lack of regard for
the EEOC's authority stems from the limited mandate provided
the agency under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a status that has
made courts disinclined to give deference to its civil rights regula-
tions. 155
149. See Cole, supra note 148, at 535.
150. Employers may not exclude applicants or take adverse action against employees
on the basis of fear of higher health care costs. If consideration of the extreme likelihood of
future harm or shortened lifespan are not evidence of effects of a disability that substantially
impairs a major life activity, it is possible that a cause of action is unavailable after the 1999
Supreme Court decisions.
151. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 99, 101(1999) (asserting that federal courts are unprincipled in
their use of summary judgments and disregard of EEOC regulations to the disadvantage of
ADA plaintiffs).
152. See id. at 109.
153. See id. at 109-10.
154. See id. at 133-41.
155. See id. at 139-50 (tracing the path of non-deference to EEOC regulations from the
weak mandate in Title VII through ADEA decisions).
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Secondly, Colker asserts that the courts may be quick to dismiss
the plaintiff with summary judgment, "ignoring the elementary
principles of who bears the burden of proof.015 6 Colker theorizes
that district courts are unwilling to send ADA cases to juries, choos-
ing instead to find no genuine issue of material fact and decide the
case as though the issues presented were entirely questions of
law. 
157
Issacharoff and Nelson explain the reasons for such unusual
treatment, shedding light on Colker's conclusions by observing
that the ADA is a potent tool for the redistribution of wealth and
opportunity.58 Its effects are far greater than the Civil Rights Act or
even the ADEA.' 9 The theory resonates with Colker's concern to
create awareness that ADA litigation is erroneously characterized
as a source of riches for plaintiffs. That is, employers and the pub-
lic perceive the ADA as a tool for employees and applicants to
harass and bully others into providing special treatment.'o
Issacharoff and Nelson believe that the perception of the ADA's
effects may be skewed by its redistributive effects, which are over-
whelming the justifications for enacting the law. They assert that
the "inherent uncertainty in the obligation to provide 'reasonable
accommodation"' creates for courts a reluctance to follow the im-
plications of the statute and regulations because the underlying
theory allocating costs to the employer is novel and unexplained.
61
Tide VII, they observe, created no independent measure of how
156. SeeColker, supra note 151, at 101.
157. Colker, supra note 151, at 110-27. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 10, at 239-81, presents a
series of cases illustrating the provision and denial of accommodations are presented. Seven
of the ten cases discussed were decided on summaryjudgment at the district court level and
affirmed by the circuit court. Id. The exceptions were brought under the Rehabilitation Act.
Id. Two of the cases presented facts that weigh heavily against the plaintiffs, both of whom
had bipolar illness and seek positions that were very sensitive and potentially dangerous to
themselves or others. Id. Yet the courts carefully examined the question of what, if any, rea-
sonable accommodation might enable the plaintiffs to fill the jobs they sought. Id. The
courts' careful scrutiny of the facts was the distinguishing factor. Despite better facts, ADA
cases nevertheless received short shrift.
158. Issacharoff& Nelson, supra note 7, at 340-41.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Tom Kertscher, Owner to Argue Dog Needed for Disability, MILWAUKEE J. SEN-
TINEL, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al (describing affluent condominium owner who had been denied
an exception to an association rule. The rule restricted dogs to twelve inches in height. The
owner sought to bring suit to require the association to allow the dog as a reasonable ac-
commodation for her disability of depression. Despite this author's repeated assertions that
neither the ADA nor the state or federal fair housing laws applied to the situation, the front
page story talked only about the ADA and disability discrimination as though it supported
such a marginal case.).
161. Issacharoff& Nelson, supra note 7, at 310.
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much redistribution is appropriate, in that any redistribution of
wealth results from a judgment finding unlawful discrimination.
1 2
ADA cases, in contrast, most typically cause redistribution by find-
ing that the employer failed to accommodate the plaintiff. That is
to say, the employer erroneously refused to reach agreement with
an employee who is a person with a disability, with regard to
changes in work schedule or workplace barriers or equipment, or
other aspects of work that a court determines would allow an em-
ployee to work and would not unduly burden the employer and
the employer's organization. 163 As a result, the employer should
either be compelled to make accommodation by injunction, or
made to pay damages, or both.
164
Van Detta and Gallipeau have yet another explanation for cases
decided on summary judgment: bad lawyering. They agree with
the general premise that the Supreme Court is off base in its 1999
holdings, reaching results contrary to the common law tradition
that courts should act in accord with the spirit of the law, rather
than relying on any strained interpretation of the statutory lan-
guage.1 66 They capture the threads of Colker's argument about
judicial disregard of EEOC regulations. However, they further as-
sert that the principal reason is that a significant number of
plaintiffs' attorneys mistakenly assume that their clients' own char-
acterization of their physical or mental limitations is sufficient to
satisfy the burden of proof that they are "substantially impaired in
a major life activity.' 6 7 The EEOC regulations, if properly con-
sulted, would inform an attorney of the need for expert testimony
on the meaning of substantial impairment in the context of work-
ing. 168
162. Id. The authors trace the simpler form of a Title VII discrimination lawsuit, in
which the only reason for discrimination is a social norm that places the plaintiff at a disad-
vantage with regard to some other applicants or employees. There is no issue as to whether
the plaintiff is expected to be qualified to do the job. The ADEA, in contrast, presents a
more difficult case in that the older applicant or employee may in fact bring significantly
different qualifications and attributes to the job. Id. at 314.
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2001).
164. Under the ADA, it would appear that the "regarded as" and "record of" prongs of
the definition of "individual with a disability" are more similar to the simple prejudice-based
case of employment discrimination. Curiously, cases on these bases are relatively rare and
seem to cause considerable confusion in the courts.
165. Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 147, at 515.
166. Id. at 514.
167. Id. at 517.
168. A plaintiff is substantially impaired in the major life activity of working if the plain-
tiff is
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Rather than choosing among these explanations for such poorly
justified holdings, it seems likely that each contributes to an un-
derstanding of the reasons to refuse the spirit of the ADA. Each of
the arguments plausibly suggests that more than one thing has
gone wrong. The very power of the ADA has caused contrary po-
litical ideology to cut it down to size. Undoubtedly, in a given case,
one or more of the reasons for a negative decision for the plaintiff
may predominate."" The assertion that cases can proliferate is not
without foundation, since ADA litigation, with its mandate for in-
170dividualized evaluation, is in large part confined to its facts.
Thus, cases have little precedential value, and each new situation
might require, if not litigation, at least negotiation between the
person with a disability and a reluctant employer.
District court judges who have little patience with the ADA's
theory and fail to require more competent representation in their
courts show a disregard for the law similar to the disregard shown
by the Supreme Court in its recent decisions against discrimina-
tion plaintiffs. The seed of change existed in the earlier case of
Bragdon v. Abbott, in which the Court observed that a sound
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range
ofjobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable train-
ing, skills, and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2() (3) (2002); see also Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 147, at 521.
169. Some hostility to the volume of cases and even to the claims of persons with dis-
abilities generally may play a role. Van Detta & Gallipeau cite open hostility from federal
judges:
This Court agrees with the Pedigo court's observation 'that the ADA as it [is] being in-
terpreted [has] the potential of being the greatest generator of litigation ever .... [It
is doubtful] whether Congress, in its wildest dreams or wildest nightmares, intended
to turn every garden variety worker's compensation claim into a federal case ....
The court doubts that the ultimate result of this law will be to provide substantial as-
sistance to persons for whom it was obviously intended .... [O]ne of the primary
beneficiaries of [the ADA] will be trial lawyers who will ingeniously manipulate [the
ADA's] ambiguities to consistently broaden its coverage so that federal courts may
become mired in employment injury cases, becoming little more than glorified
worker's compensation referees.' "
Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 147, at 512-13 (citing Fussell v. Ga. Ports Auth., 906 F.
Supp. 1561, 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (quoting Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc., 891 F. Supp.
482, 485-86 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (footnote omitted))); see a/soJohn V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts and
Federalism: Common Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 95, 96 (1999) (dis-
cussing the law's unfavorable treatment of persons with the disability of mental illness).
170. See Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 7, at 336-40.
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interpretation of the ADA must effect the purposes of the Act
without causing too great an interruption in society.1 71 It appears,
however, that part of society now believes that the disruption has
been too great.
D. The Present Limits
Interpretation of the law reflects society, its values, politics, and
financial resources. The means the federal courts have used to
contain the social impact and judicial burdens of ADA claims are
troubling because they denigrate the very substance of legal inter-
pretation. Yet, if the problem of judicial vigilantism is not
widespread, bad judging has greater implications for the current
judiciary than for the issues in the long run. Given the political will,
Congress could instruct the Court about its wishes by amending the
ADA to require that persons claiming disability be evaluated for sub-
stantial impairment in their. unmitigated state. To accomplish this,
Congress could simply endorse the carefully drafted EEOC regula-
tions that provide instruction regarding the elements and burdens
of proof, or might draft some replacement provisions with more
patient involvement from the business community.
Yet, legislators are reluctant to open up the issue of ADA re-
quirements by introducing an amendment that invites debate and
possible repeal of ADA provisions. The judicial decisions limiting
ADA claims seem to reflect impatience with the liberal political left
and its inclination to redistribution; voices from that quarter would
loudly support more liberal implementation of ADA principles. To
some extent, the decisions may also manifest irritation with public
responsibility for people in poverty, whatever the reasons, who
have ill-prepared legal counsel and who personally fail to reflect
the values of those on the bench. Such considerations would never
be articulated by the courts in the context of disability discrimina-
tion litigation. Yet, those very considerations place the ADA as a civil
rights statute squarely with Title VII, a characterization that departs
from its bipartisan support at its enactment a dozen years ago.
171. See 524 U.S. at 631 (reviewing the purposes of the Act, the regulations and guide-
lines, and considerable expert opinion regarding asymptomatic HIV, the Court affirmed the
Court of Appeals judgment that the plaintiff was a person with a disability, though differing
with the judgment below that the conclusion could be reached as a matter of law).
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People with disabilities, as a group, are different from other dis-
advantaged groups in their impact on the workplace. People with
disabilities come from the widest range of backgrounds and ex-
periences, some of which contribute to a sharp perception of
exclusion by their own social and economic group. Some people
with disabilities feel that exclusion in the form of a strong sense of
being owed some compensation by society. The ADA is the means
to demand some compensation in the form of accommodation
and compliance with the law. Perhaps it is a problem that the cost
comes from the individual employer, rather than society's coffers.
The requirement for reasonable accommodation at the em-
ployer's expense may cause employers to pay more for employees
who are less capable than they could otherwise hire. Sometimes
employers are surprised by claims of their bad behavior (and the
costs of litigation) when their sole intention was to hire or retain
the best workers. Regardless of one's empathy for persons with dis-
abilities, both generally and specifically, it is easy to understand the
groundswell of frustration among those regulated by this remark-
able law. It has eroded benevolence as well as raising awareness
and combating prejudices.
A core value of the ADA cases remains, that the law contem-
plates individuals with objectively measurable disabilities who need
assistance to overcome prejudice, stigma, physical barriers, and
unnecessarily burdensome job schedules to get and keep good
jobs. The majority of ADA plaintiffs, however, have less objectively
measurable disabilities, many having back conditions and mental
impairments. Further, most already have jobs and seek accommo-
dation within their current environment. For some employers,
therefore, the comparison between the employee before the dis-
ability claim and after is measured in compelled expenditures that
erode anticipated financial well-being, without the reassuring cer-
tainty that the accommodation is necessary, benevolent and useful.
To some extent, employer pessimism is the legacy of excluding
people with disabilities, and must be endured. To some extent, it is
realistic doubt about the outcome of making accommodations,
particularly those that appear to favor the person with disabilities
over other employees in such quality of life matters as job duties,
scheduling, and work space assignments.
There is no absolute optimum definition of the people who
should receive the protection of the ADA. Indeed, the right to sue
should depend finally upon the potential for some plaintiffs to
cause real disruption in society. The right of the individual to
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income, job security, and choice of activities, after all, rests on the
assumption of society's ongoing stability. Arguably, even the
broadest interpretation of the ADA can cause no such cataclysmic
result as social instability, unlike, perhaps, such social wrongs as
exclusion by race or gender. The right interpretation of the ADA,
instead, varies with the time and will change again.
The ADA's marginalization could be altered by a change in the
law, or the regulatory agency, or in the nature of the plaintiffs
themselves. An analysis of which change is most likely to happen,
and which might succeed, can provide guidance that might hasten
a return to sound law and implementation of the benevolence and
social optimism of the ADA's purposes. It is unlikely that political
change is possible in the foreseeable future, since it was rejected
even at a time of remarkably robust need for workers in the mid to
late-1990s. Empowering the regulatory agency, the EEOC, while it
is under a Republican administration at least until 2005, seems
most unlikely.
The change in the nature of the plaintiffs themselves is likely to
revitalize the law of disability discrimination and provide for the
continuing employment of older workers. Envisioning such a fu-
ture creates a greater likelihood that the right steps can be
recognized and taken, the right cases filed, and the right advocacy
directed towards Congress, 112 at times that are most effective.
III. NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: DISABILITY
AND THE BABY BOOMERS
The nature and needs of older people, including those with dis-
abilities, will inevitably change. The first generation to experience
an extended retirement, living to great age in unprecedented
numbers, is reaching its hundredth birthday.173 None could, during
their working years, anticipate the time they might spend being
old, being retired. While the upper limits on natural lifespan are
172. Many state disability discrimination laws continue to provide the protection that
the ADA provided prior to the Supreme Court's decisions, which is in keeping with the
Court's states' rights agenda.
173. An individual who was age seventy-five in 1995 had a life expectancy of almost
eighty-five years, while white women had a life expectancy of nearly eighty-seven years. ELD-
ERLAW, supra note 7, at 7. The population of centenarians has become too numerous for
individual national recognition by the morning television weatherman.
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much debated,1 74 the better health and fitness of retirees today as
compared with those retiring in the 1960s and 1970s is clear.175 Bet-
ter nutrition, decreases in smoking and excessive drinking as a
social recreation, and huge strides in health care efficacy have ex-
tended the years of vitality for the older population. 7 6 In the
foreseeable future, senior citizens are likely to be active across
much of their lifespans.
Because advances in medical science will keep people alive
longer, there are greater chances for elders to develop disabili-
ties. 77 Individuals who might have died in early adulthood from.
accidental trauma such as auto accidents are more likely to survive.
Those who would die at mid-life from an accumulation of effects
from workplace hazards or destructive lifestyle choices can receive
rehabilitation and medication, and live. In mid to later life, the
first organ to become cancerous, succumb to infection, or fail in its
function can be treated or replaced. Thus, the presence of older
workers, those active well past the traditional retirement age, re-
sults from a confluence of social and scientific success.
A. Aging Will Be Different (It Already Is)
It is a virtual certainty that as baby boomers begin to reach re-
tirement age in 2010, the number of older participants in all
spheres of life will grow rapidly. For most, disabilities associated
with aging will not begin for at least a decade from the age of re-
tirement, so there will be little incentive to slow down. Therefore,
174. See generally, Richard A. Miller, The Biology of Aging and Longevity, in PRINCIPLES OF
GERIATRIC MEDICINE AND GERONTOLOGY, supra note 72, at 3 (discussing the limits of natu-
ral life span based on accepted theories of aging).
175. Between 1985 and 1995 alone, older persons reporting a sedentary lifestyle
dropped from thirty-four percent to twenty-eight percent among men and from forty-four
percent to thirty-nine percent among women. FEDERAL INTERAGENCY FORUM ON AGING
RELATED STATISTICS, supra note 102, at 33. The Census Bureau reports that among those age
sixty-five to sixty-nine, 44.0 percent report some disability, 30.7 percent report severe disability,
and 8.1 percent report that they need assistance. Census Bureau Releases Data on Disabilities,
available at http://www.elderweb.com/default.php?PageID=2448&Version=0&Font=0 (last
visited Apr. 13, 2002). Among those age eighty and over, 73.6 percent report some disability,
56.6 percent report severe disability, and 34.9 percent report a need for assistance. Id.
176. See Hudson, supra note 108, at 6; 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 3-
15-3-17 (on the incidence of smoking, drinking and overweight in the older population)
and 3-18-3-19 (on the incidence of functional limitations).
177. See ELDERLAW, supra note 7, at 18-19.
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regardless of when chronic impairments arrive, only severe prob-
lems are likely to cause many baby boomers to stay home.
This generation, born to the returning soldiers of World War II
and their spouses eager to reestablish domestic life, has a number
of attributes. Baby boomers belong to a uniquely huge age
group-aptly described as the basketball moving through a py-
thon. Two results are common: First, many baby boomers identify
strongly with the interests and activities of their peers rather than
looking to older generations for guidance; and second, many baby
boomers have had to compete fiercely with their peers for their
achievements.I"8
The resulting views can only be catalogued from anecdotal ob-
servations and generalizations. While these views are not entirely
true in defining any single individual, they capture the distinguish-
ing characteristics of the group. Baby boomers have been
perceived as hard working and hard playing, pursuing recreational
and fitness activities their parents would not have considered at a
similar age. The reverse explanation is that baby boomers are Pe-
ter Pans who resist unwelcome realizations of their own aging.
Some attribute their unwillingness to step quietly aside for the
younger generation to the intense interest their parents took in
their war-delayed offspring. Baby boomers' experiences as young
Americans support the notion that they should be integrated into
the activities of the moment, to be central to the significant events
of the day.
By 2030, those over age sixty-five will be twenty percent of the
U.S. population, with baby boomers among those age sixty-five to
seventy-five."' These baby boomers will not be excluded from the
activities they have pursued throughout their adult lives, including
both work and recreation. Because they bring different character-
istics to the negotiation of employment, the ADA may support
their intention when they need accommodation for disabilities.
178. See 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 15, at 7-1-7-2 (citing CHERYL RUSSELL,
100 PREDICTIONS FOE THE BABY Boom (1987)).
179. Federal Interagency Forum on Aging Related Statistics, supra note 102, at 2.
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B. Baby Boomer Employment as a Social Phenomenon
Many retirement-age baby boomers will be in the workforce. 8 "
Some will continue for employment satisfaction, either because of
a lifetime of habit, or from dedication to particular work or goals
that have not been fully realized by the traditional time of retire-
ment. Some will choose the routine human interaction work can
provide, even if their careers provided no great advancement or
reward.' Other older people will need to work. 82 Recognizing the
inadequacy of Social Security and the lack of pensions for many,
Congress has already abolished disincentives to employment by
repealing the forfeiture of Social Security benefits."3
With time, chronic conditions will make it more difficult for
some seniors to continue in the work force. Yet employers are
likely to recognize many retirees as desirable workers. They have,
as long-term employees, a history of work that can be assessed, and
possibly positions of skill and judgment that are seldom found in
the younger population. A large number of jobs depend less on
physical strength and more on such characteristics as poise, de-
pendability, and maturity traits for which older workers have often
been valued.
Retirement-age workers also have access to resources that are
not available to younger persons, particularly those who never
180. See Mary Williams Walsh, Reversing Decades-Long Trend, Americans Retiring Later in
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at A] (noting that the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that
the trend to earlier retirement halted in the mid-1980s and recently reversed).
181. See Alison Barnes, From the Editor, ELDER'S ADVISOR, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall, 1999) at iii,
iv (citing Employee Benefits Research Institute Issue Brief 206 and a 1998 EBRI survey).
Sixty percent of older respondents to 1998 study said that a major reason to remain in the
workforce after retirement age was they enjoyment of work, and the desire to stay involved.
Id.; cf. Dana Burr Bradley, A Reason to Rise Each Morning: The Meaning of Volunteering in the
Lives of Older Adults, 23 GENERATIONS 45, 48 (1999-2000) (stating that "[t]he routine of
daily telephone calls, weekly rehearsals, or monthly board of directors meetings gives a
sense of direction and accomplishment to the volunteer").
182. Very few workers in 2001 are able to take early retirement because of inadequate
pensions and the need for health care coverage. See Walsh, supra note 180, at A13 (report-
ing that "[t]oday, only 10 percent of workers are able to take early retirement," due in part
to inadequate pensions and the need for health care coverage). A significant factor is the
shift of retirement plans from defined benefits to defined contributions. Barnes, supra note
181, at iv. In the 1998 EBRI study, thirty-eight percent of respondents identified the need to
earn to make ends meet, while twenty-six percent expected to support family members.
JOSEPH F. QUINN, RETIREMENT PATTERNS AND BRIDGEJOBS IN THE 1990s, Employee Benefit
Research Institute Issue (EBRI) Brief No. 206, Feb. 1999.
183. See Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-182, 114 Stat.
198 (eliminating the so called "earnings test" on April 7, 2000).
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have been able to work steadily. Many baby boomers, who have
had the opportunity to foresee the possibility of their own extreme
old age, will bring with them economic security from a lifetime of
accumulated retirement assets, however modest. While retiree in-
comes tend to be low as compared with those of mid-life workers,
many will have savings and investments that are held unspent.
Many will own a home, some of which will be without a mort-
184gage.
Those resources and skills together represent the opportunity to
address resistance to accommodation for people with disabilities.
Anecdote and likelihood of a satisfactory agreement, the funda-
mentals of changing perception, will most likely support a
different characterization of an important segment of workers with
disabilities, older workers. In most cases, the interaction between
employee and employer will take place entirely in the private
sphere, though disability discrimination law will inevitably be a
presence underlying their discussions. Since older employees are
more likely to become impaired over a relatively short period of
employment, a decade or so, the volume of instances required to
change perception is likely to come rapidly. The instances of failed
negotiation because an employer refuses to participate in negotia-
tion or reasonable accommodation are likely to come quickly as
well.
The possibilities for successful negotiation are strong because
there are positive motivations on the employer's side, and knowl-
edge and familiarity that presumably are positive motivations on
the employee's side, plus room for negotiation of a non-coerced
and functional accommodation for both. The conclusion of the
calculation of "undue hardship," which relieves the employer of
any responsibility for continued relationship with the employee or
185
applicant, is multi-faceted and somewhat subjective. If the em-
184. The author believes that retiree home ownership in the early 1990s was upwards of
about seventy-five percent, most of them without a mortgage. Given more frequent changes
of location, and less family stability for baby boomers, it is unlikely that so much capital will
be held in the form of a home. It is possible that many will have stocks and other invest-
ments, instead.
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2002). Factors to be considered in determining whether an ac-
commodation would impose an undue hardship include "i) The nature and net cost of the
accommodation needed... ; ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the accommodation ... ; iii) the overall financial resources of
the covered entity... ; iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity... ; and
v) the impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the im-
pact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the
facility's ability to conduct business." Id. § 1630.2(p) (2).
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ployer never concludes that the burden is unjustified, the possibili-
ties for compromise remain as open as the employee or applicant
wants them to be.
6
Thus, discussions can proceed as the ADA regulations instruct:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it
may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an infor-
mal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation. This process should
identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that could over-
come those limitations.
8 7
The tenor of such an exchange is, at best, a mutual search and,
at worst, a less imbalanced negotiation between an older employee
recently disabled and an employer who values that employee. The
mutual search is more likely when both parties are seeking solu-
tions that will enable continuing employment. Consider, for
example, the discussion of accommodation in which employers
and employees consider the reasonableness of substantial costs
(say, $5,000 for a chairlift for an employee who cannot use the
stairs). It may well be reasonable for an older worker to pay some
portion of the cost of accommodation, and the employer may be
more willing to shoulder the rest once assured the worker has a
commitment to the needs of employment.
Consider, also, the satisfaction of joint investment in the costs
when an employee with a disability proposes to resume work that
must take place entirely at home, leaving unaccounted for interac-
tions that would take place spontaneously in the workplace. Such a
change represents a loss that may be difficult to quantify or de-
scribe with particularity. Courts have found such an
accommodation might be reasonable, leaving for the future the
circumstances in which telecommuting and various forms of long
distance information provision might make it so. 188 Thinking of
such agreements in terms of mutual investments and obligations
fortifies the ongoing employer-employee relationship.
186. This consideration raises the distinct likelihood that a minor amendment to the
ADA is necessary to assure that offers made in the negotiations cannot be used in subse-
quent litigation to show the opinion of the employer that an accommodation offered was
reasonable or that contribution offered by the employee indicated recognition of an undue
burden.
187. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (3) (2001).
188. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 E3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir. 1995).
Envisioning a Future
University of Michigan Journal of Law Refom
This is not to say that the ADA's instruction on funds for reason-
able accommodation should be altered from the original
language. The balance of "reasonableness" should be struck, in
negotiation or by the courts, to allow the employment of an indi-
vidual with disabilities even though that person lacks resources.
The person with a disability should never be required to contrib-
ute to the cost of an accommodation that is "reasonable." Rather,
the arrival of the aged baby boomer worker provides an opportu-
nity to reconsider the positive values of accommodation to
facilitate employment for people with disabilities.
Industry's desire to employ elder workers is already apparent.
New patterns of employment are already appearing, including so-
called "bridge jobs" that provide freedom that was elusive in con-
tinuing in a full time career.8 9 For employers, such jobs might
utilize the experience of older workers, while providing opportuni-
ties for younger workers to step into positions of executive
190
power.
These changes projected for the future job market inevitably
have a darker side that bears careful monitoring.'9' Two effects,
both of which disadvantage younger participants in the workforce,
are readily foreseeable. Widespread willingness to provide accom-
modations for older workers may open a door to revitalization in
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, rather than an innocent
preference for the known and competent worker. That is, the
older worker may in many cases prompt empathy, in significant
part because he or she may represent the employer's parent or fu-
ture self. Such empathy for older people and their impairments is
in itself positive, but it cannot be considered laudable when the
reverse is a failure to empathize with younger adults of different
backgrounds because their lives and activities have not mirrored
that of the employment decision-maker.
The hiring pool of the future is likely to be filled in large pro-
portion with young immigrant workers,1 92 whose values and
189. See Barnes, supra note 181, at iv.
190. Japan has institutionalized a system of later career, "step-down" jobs that provide
seasoned executives with opportunity to provide wise counsel to younger decision-makers
but limit any other leadership powers.
191. Support for those who are likely to be viewed as "the other" requires vigilance be-
cause it appears that this impulse is present in most societies and, therefore, needs a target.
See generally, SIMONE DE BEAUVIOR, THE COMING OF AGE (1972) (writing that people view old
age as affecting only other people).
192. See Barbara Crossette, Against a Trend, U.S. Population Will Bloom, U.N. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A6; see also Robert Samuelson, As the Population Shrinks: Burden of an
Aging World, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Mar. 1, 2001, at IlA (noting that all developed nations
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expressions of interest are likely to seem unfamiliar to conserva-
tive, middle-aged employers. Economic necessity is likely to dictate
the inclination to hire the new workers. Yet, the opportunities for
young, foreign workers' advancement might be kept artificially low
by lack of trust and familiarity, and the lack of need to fill more
responsible positions if they are held by long term employees who
have no incentives to retire.193 Employers reasonably may be moti-
vated to keep a larger proportion of long-term workers upon
whose familiar values and personalities they can rely.1 94 A balance
will need to be struck between opportunities for each group, not
only for the goal of avoiding discrimination on the bases of age,
disability, or race and ethnicity, but because younger workers do
bring valuable different perspectives to their endeavors.
A strong incentive to prefer older workers in the future may al-
ready have appeared in the employment patterns adopted in the
poor job market of 1993-94. Young professionals in significant
numbers were hired as consultants and part-time workers to avoid
the costs of benefits and the obligation to provide a continuous
flow of work. 95 Because full-time jobs with benefits were in very
short supply, many capable workers with advanced degrees had no
job stability or economic security upon their entry into the mar-
ket. 9 6 The pattern mirrors the service industry's use of not-quite-
full-time workers, scheduling each employee to work slightly less
than the requirement to trigger benefits.
97
The strategy probably saves from one-third to one-half of addi-
tional expenditures for fringe benefits and retirement funds, so it
should be very attractive to an employer if good employees are
willing to work on this basis. For many older workers, the option of
receiving no benefits and the obligation of less than full-time work
will have birth rates that fail to replace current population, but that the U.S. is likely to be
unique in having a net gain in population due to immigration).
193. See Carrie Johnson, Hiring of Foreign Workers Frustrates Native Job Seekers, WASH. POST,
Feb. 27, 2002, at El (noting that the current increase in work visas has given employers the
ability to hire more foreign workers).
194. See Louis Uchitelle, These Days, Layoffs Compete With Loyalty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2001, Section 3, at 4 (examining the balance between employee loyalty and an employer's
economic necessity).
195. See Margot Slade, At This Firm the Clients Hire Inside Consultants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1993, at B9 (noting that having consultants instead of salaried workers saves the client's
money as well as providing jobs).
196. See Bob Herbert, In America: America's Job Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1993, at A23
(examining the difficulty college graduates have finding jobs following graduation).
197. See Lane Evans, For Temporary Workers, A Full-Time Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
1999, Section 3, at 36 (describing the tendency of employers to hire workers at less than full
time in order to avoid paying benefits).
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
is very desirable. Older workers have health insurance and a stable
basis of income in their Social Security and pensions. The ideal for
many is an interesting job that leaves the opportunity for recrea-
tion and travel. If such older consultant/managers are a strong
presence in the workforce, employers may well be able to offer
younger workers similar "bare bones" compensation.
In sum, many retirees bring a long work history to the retire-
ment-age job market, and perhaps their post-retirement employers
already know their particular talents. Further, those with the high-
est education levels are most likely to live longest, maintain good
health, and be desirable employees. If they require accommoda-
tion and the employer refuses, the older worker is likely to be in a
better position to bring a successful action for disability discrimina-
tion. This positive track record, though not strong in precedential
value, surely can provide opportunity for other plaintiffs with simi-
lar disabilities who, regardless of age and work record, want to
bring actions seeking similar accommodation. The fact that this
development might present new circumstances for discriminatory
errors in judgment is reason for vigilance, yet welcome for a sub-
stantial number of persons with disabilities.
CONCLUSION
It is good medicine to envision a better time for reversing dis-
ability discrimination, and realistic to recognize that changes in
financial and political times might make it possible. Sadly, the Su-
preme Court's recent decisions suggest a slow-down in the number
of ADA claims, which will no doubt make it impossible for num-
bers of people with disabilities to require reasonable
accommodation of their employers for some years to come. Work-
ing expectations can be lost in a decade of frustration.
Recognizing the possibility of demographic changes is not a call
for advocates to loaf through the next couple of decades. The
lower courts are quite capable of readjusting the barriers to dis-
crimination by, for example, finding that a greater number of
claimants are substantially impaired with mitigating measures.
Such a change would at least moderate the impact of recent deci-
sions. There is time to test the cases of workers who become
impaired in the course of their retirement age work and find their
employer unwilling to accommodate their impairments, despite
the employee's willingness to negotiate on terms. There is time to
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establish that the older plaintiff need only be significantly re-
stricted in the ability to perform as compared with the average
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities,198 rather
than as compared with an average person of comparable age.
This vision cannot come into being spontaneously. Rather, it
must be part of a collective perception, as well as individual wishes,
to utilize the working power of people with disabilities. It is, of
course, impossible to say with any certainty whether such a sce-
nario will develop. Factors in the economy, the birth rate,
immigration standards, and health care interventions for the aged
and people with disabilities may alter a vision so contingent and so
far removed. Yet it is only appropriate that older workers have a
role in correcting the system to reflect the remarkable intentions
of a moment when genuine, uncoerced bipartisan support en-
dorsed a commitment to providing the means for people with
disabilities to work and participate fully in society. 99
198. See 29 C.ER. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2002).
199. See generally W. Andrew Achenbaum, The Social Compact in American History, 22
GENERATIONS 15 (Winter 1998-99); John Cornman and Eric Kingson, What is a Social Com-
pact? Would We Know One If We Saw It, 22 GENERATIONS 10 (Winter 1998-99); Robert B.
Reich, Broken Faith: Why We Need to Renew the Social Compact, 22 GENERATIONS 19 (Winter
1998-99) (discussing at length society's reciprocal promises to the aged).
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